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Beginning in the 18th century, the question of what makes a nation has occupied a prominent place in German 
politics. From the national theories of the 18th-century German Romantics, who identified cultural and ethnic 
factors as being the key determinants, to modern civic nationalists and postnationalists, who point to liberal civic 
values and institutions, the importance of collective identity and how it is oriented has remained an important 
topic for German scholars and policymakers. Using survey research, I assess the accuracy and relevance of these 
theories in contemporary German society. I find that, contrary to the optimism of modern thinkers, German 
collective identity remains aligned with the national theories of the Romantics, resulting in ethnic discrimination 
and heightened fears over the loss of culture through external ideological and ethnic sources.
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The potent force of nationalism has deep roots in German 
history. From the first conceptualizations of a singular 
nation by the German Romantics to unification and the 
1871 constitution to the post-reunification era, the manner 
in which Germans have perceived themselves as a nation 
has played a vital role in both domestic and international 
politics. But while nationalism in the eras of Johann Gottfried 
Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Otto von Bismarck, and 
Adolf Hitler are generally well understood, the character of 
contemporary German nationalism remains a topic of much 
debate. While there have always been fringe nationalist 
parties like the National Democratic Party (NDP), they 
remained just that: parties on the fringes of public thought. 
Indeed, the NDP has never succeeded in passing the voting 
threshold of 5% needed to enter the Bundestag parliament 
in federal elections (“September 24,” 2017). However, 
a surge in nationalist sentiments since 2013 threatens the 
multicultural society Germany has nurtured for 75 years.
This surge has been most associated with the rapid rise of 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party following the 
European debt crisis that began in late 2009. During the 
eurozone crisis, five European Union member states—Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and most notably, Greece—
experienced extremely high budget deficits and public debt, 
triggering a sovereign debt crisis that threatened financial 
institutions and the economic stability of the eurozone in 
its entirety, including Germany (“The Eurozone in Crisis,” 
2015). The AfD received just under 5% of the vote in the 
2013 federal elections, which led many to speculate that 
the party would implode soon after its conception (“Will 
Germany’s,” 2013). Yet, despite initial failure, the AfD 
shocked both policymakers and opponents in the 2017 
federal elections by receiving almost 12.6% of the vote to 
become one of the largest parties in Germany (Clarke, 2017).
This new phase in German politics begs the following 
questions: does the AfD’s rise to prominence reflect a 
deeper trend in how Germans perceive themselves as a 
national community? Or is the AfD’s recent electoral 
success simply a notable but ultimately temporary setback 
to regionalist and internationalist ends? After all, 12.6% of 
the vote is still not close at all to the combined 53.4% that 
the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received, and 
is nowhere near a majority (Clarke, 2017). These questions 
have become especially pertinent in the wake of the February 
19, 2020, terrorist attack in Hanau, Germany. The attack 
was carried out by a right-wing extremist whose xenophobia 
led him to target two shisha bars that the Turkish community 
frequented before killing his mother and himself (Kaschel, 
2020). The shootings that saw the tragic deaths of ten 
people—nine had an immigrant background, and the tenth 
was the perpetrator’s mother—have brought these questions 
regarding German collective identity to the forefront of 
public discourse (Kaschel, 2020).
A surge in nationalist sentiments 
since 2013 threatens the 
multicultural society Germany 
has nurtured for 75 years.
In recent scholarship, Allen (2010) argued that Germans 
have shifted away from an ethnocentric view of national 
identity towards a cultural and civic one, and Bassey 
(2012) expanded on that argument in noting the formative 
role that the German state has played in constructing this 
more cultural and civic conception of the nation. More 
famously, both Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas 
have presented theories of constitutional patriotism, which 
grounds collective identity in the shared norms, values, 
and procedures constructed through a liberal-democratic 
constitution. They have rejected the relevance of a national 
identity, arguing that it will be or has been replaced by a 
postnational one following World War II. Their optimism 
towards a shift in collective German identity has been shared 
by previous administrations and, hesitantly, by the current 
government headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In contrast to these perceptions, Connor (1994) asserted 
that traditional German nationalism will inevitably show 
increasing signs of recovery and that the “obituaries for 
ethnonationalism have proved immature” (p. 181). To clarify, 
Connor did not believe that German ethnonationalism 
would be akin to the racially driven chauvinism that defined 
the Nazi epoch, but acknowledged parallels. Other scholars 
have gone further, suggesting that German nationalism 
has adopted a more ethnocentric form that has become 
increasingly prominent; the Brookings Institution even 
published a policy brief on the new threat posed by the AfD’s 
apparent ethnonationalism (Stelzenmüller, 2019).
These approaches cannot adequately account for the 
resurgence of nationalism in Germany. In this paper, 
I examine arguments that the form of nationalism in 
contemporary Germany is of a strictly cultural, civic, or 
ethnic nature, and I work to understand the state’s role in 
inducing such beliefs. I begin by describing the philosophical 
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frameworks of the Romantics and modern theorists. Later, 
I present my argument that German neo-nationalism has 
taken on an ethnocultural form that harkens back to the 
German Romantics and the theories relating to postnational 
identities are mistaken. To support these claims, I utilize 
quantitative and qualitative sources, including voting 
statistics, opinion polls, statements and speeches by various 
government officials, and insights provided by scholars. These 
approaches position me to assess the nature of Germany’s 
neo-nationalism and the validity of its narrower conceptions.
A History of 
German Nationalism
Theoretical Roots
The study of nationalism can very well be nebulous, so 
defining a “nation” at its base is important in approaching 
the question of German nationalism with some clarity. 
Plano and Olton (1969) defined a nation as “a social group 
which shares a common ideology, common institutions and 
customs, and a sense of homogeneity. . . . [T]here is also 
present a strong group sense of belonging associated with 
a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own” 
(as cited in Connor, 1994, p. 92). In his seminal Imagined 
Communities, Anderson (1983) helped shape how scholars 
frame questions on nationalism by offering a good starting 
point. He defined the nation as “an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign” (p. 6). This imagined community is limited on 
the basis that “even the largest of them . . . has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries” and sovereign because “nations dream of 
being free. . . . [T]he gage and emblem of this freedom is the 
sovereign state” (p. 7). With these insights, we can synthesize 
a definition: a nation is a porous, perceived community 
whose members believe they share a sense of commonness 
intimately tied to a certain territory. Whether this perception 
accurately describes contemporary nationalism and the birth 
of the new international order will be assessed. 
Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte were 
among the first to create theories of German nationalism. 
Herder’s transfiguration of the concept of a Volk [people] in 
his 1784 Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
[Ideas for the Philosophy of Human History] was compelling 
and acted as a “radiation-point” around which the “new 
gospel of nationalism” revolved (Hayes, 1927, p. 722). For 
Herder, the Volk derived not through race or ethnicity, but 
through the culture that one inherits as a result of being 
within a particular environment (Hayes, 1927). His idea of 
an environment can be broken down to three fundamental 
factors: physical geography, historical development, and 
folk-character. Although Herder failed to provide a precise 
definition of folk-character, it can best be described as the 
overarching, generalized personality of a particular national 
group. He argued that the natural state of humanity entails 
that a single nation should maintain a single national culture 
and, as Charles Taylor (1994) pointed out, that “a Volk 
should be true to itself ” (p. 31). In other words, a nation 
ought to preserve the integrity of its culture.
With regards to the ideal of authenticity, Herder asserted 
that the Church, in advocating for the continued use of 
specialized Latin, inhibited forms of expression through 
local vernaculars. This, in turn, inhibited the nation from 
realizing its true self (Schmidt, 1957). On a side note, the 
popularity of Herder’s thought lends merit to Anderson’s 
suggestion that the specialization of Latin played a role in 
bringing about national consciousnesses that diametrically 
opposed encompassing religious communities.
Although Fichte defined the 
nation in terms of language and 
general culture at a superficial 
level, his theory ultimately 
rested on ethnicity.
While Herder stated explicitly that he spoke of culture in a 
broad sense, there is some disagreement regarding Fichte’s 
arguments as to what made the nation. It is commonly 
believed that Fichte’s 1808 Reden an die deutsche Nation 
[Addresses to the German Nation] merely narrowed the scope 
of Herder’s theory in that Fichte saw the purity of the native 
language, a cultural artifact, determined a national identity 
(Martyn, 1997). Although Fichte defined the nation in 
terms of language and general culture at a superficial level, 
his theory ultimately rested on ethnicity. His appeals to 
Abstammung and Abkunft [descent and origin] occupied a 
prominent place in his thought, especially in his Reden. And 
though he officially rejected shared language as the principal 
component of a national identity, Fichte’s consistent references 
to descent and origin betrayed his explicit denunciations 
of shared blood (Abizadeh, 2005). Indeed, according to 
Abizadeh (2005), Fichte’s call for die ursprüngliche Sprache 
des Stammvolkes [the original language of one’s ancestral 
people] when speaking on the expressive freedom of a nation 
was inseparable from genealogical purity. As Abizadeh noted, 
“Language must indeed coincide with descent” (p. 354). The 
twin ideas of a history and ancestry common to all Germans 
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are therefore components of Fichte’s theory of nationalism, 
regardless of whether he acknowledged it or even desired it. 
Language only constituted a component of the theory, not 
its entirety. Although Fichte did not offer an ethnonational 
historiography for the German people, the idea of an 
ancestral bond between all Germans was compelling, and 
his work would be invoked by future German nationalists, 
particularly the traditional conservatives and the Nazis 
during the Weimar Republic. Hence, many historians have 
attributed the fervor with which the Nazis pursued their 
ambitions to theorists like Fichte (e.g., Kaufmann, 1942). 
The German Romantics’ concept of the nation rested on an 
ethnocultural foundation. Though Herder’s approach rested 
on a broad culture, Fichte provided a more precise argument 
as to what gave life to the nation and what differentiates 
it from other nations by emphasizing people’s ancestral 
history. However, whether the Romantics were accurate in 
describing the essence of nations can only be determined 
when contrasted with modern conceptions.
Modern Theories of Nationalism
While ethnocultural theories of nationalism found favor 
among academic circles prior to the conclusion of World War 
II, the end of the war in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold 
War brought forth a number of theories positing that nations 
are defined in civic terms. To modern theorists, nations derive 
from the idea that “political attachment ought to centre on 
the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures 
of a liberal democratic constitution” rather than less tangible 
notions of culture, ethnicity, and language (Müller & 
Scheppele, 2008, p. 67). The division of the German state 
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the west and 
the German Democratic Republic on the east spawned two 
distinct theories of constitutional patriotism: the “protective” 
patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, which emphasized the 
physical structure of a nation, and the “purifying” patriotism 
of Jürgen Habermas, which emphasized its ethical structure 
(Müller, 2006). These theories stemmed from a series of 
lectures given by Karl Jaspers in 1946 wherein he argued that 
German solidarity could be found only in reflecting on their 
involvement in World War II and the Holocaust.
It was from the insights offered by Jaspers that Sternberger 
constructed his theory of Verfassungspatriotismus [constitut-
ional patriotism] (Bagchi, 2016). Sternberger argued that 
collective identity should derive from the institutions of the 
democratic state and the general concept of the rule of law. 
As Müller (2006) pointed out, this argument depended on a 
“‘militant democracy’ capable of defending itself against its 
internal and external enemies” (p. 284). Having witnessed 
the Weimar Republic’s collapse and the fragmentation of 
German society into rigidly defined factions, he saw this 
political attachment to the state as necessary for social 
cohesion and stability (Müller, 2006). The idea that there are 
enemies that the state must be defended against suggests that 
he was not idealistic enough so as to embrace cosmopolitan 
notions of identity. Rather, Sternberger’s theory danced 
between the ethnocentric chauvinism of nationalism 
on the one hand and the idealistic internationalism of 
cosmopolitanism (Kobyliński, 2017). He saw the primary 
role of politics as the eternal push towards peace and his 
constitutional patriotism as the vehicle by which it could be 
achieved in a democratic state. To emphasize the plausibility 
of his theory, he offered an interpretation of history positing 
that traditional European states had been characterized by the 
presence of constitutional patriotism, particularly Germany 
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
For Sternberger, the Holocaust 
brought about the collective 
emotional conditions that 
would push society towards 
constitutional patriotism.
Sternberger employed arguments that made use of the 
Jaspersian concept of “metaphysical guilt,” which referred 
to the fracturing of solidarity that Jaspers saw across human 
beings and the collective responsibility Germans felt after 
the Holocaust (Müller, 2006, p. 280). For Sternberger, the 
Holocaust brought about the collective emotional conditions 
that would push society towards constitutional patriotism. 
Considering the historical precedent and the situation of 
German society, the shift back to constitutional patriotism 
following the divergent path that the state took in the 1930s 
and 1940s was, in Sternberger’s eyes, likely and perhaps 
inevitable after 1945 (Kobyliński, 2017, p. 47).
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism was 
inspired by but diverged from Sternberger’s at a fundamental 
level. Unsurprisingly, Habermas’s theory reflected the new 
optimism that had swept Europe’s intelligentsia in the late 
stages of the Cold War: instead of grounding collective 
identity with the state and the physical institutions 
associated with it, Habermas pinned his theory on the 
liberal political principles and values embedded within a 
constitution (Kobyliński, 2017). He believed that a return to 
the pre-national patriotism espoused by Sternberger was not 
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even possible given recent history. Rather, using Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, he conceived that 
individuals would develop “post-conventional identities” in 
which they would construct reasoned moral philosophies 
and abide by them honestly (Müller, 2006). It is here that 
Habermas’s theory maintains a rationalist line of thought: 
the restructuring of the traditional German state to adhere 
to the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] and the Sozialstaat [welfare 
state] would enable people to engage in the public sphere so 
they can reason with one another as free individuals (Müller, 
2006). The rule of law would push a substantive view of what 
constituted universal norms and protect democratic processes, 
and the welfare state would provide the material conditions 
necessary for individuals to engage in such democratic 
processes as equals. Habermas then focused on the question 
of German guilt, and it is in the controversy surrounding 
how best to handle this guilt that the question of the nature 
of German nationalism takes root; this controversy came to 
be known as the Historikerstreit [historian’s dispute].
For Habermas, the Holocaust 
was a lesson for humanity as a 
whole, and German guilt could 
lead to an identity based on a 
common sense of humanity.  
In contrast to more conservative thinkers, Habermas 
regarded arguments that the only way to establish a stronger 
collective German identity was to embrace a “moderate or 
accepting view of the Holocaust” as simply old-nationalistic 
(Menent, 2018). For Habermas, the Holocaust was a lesson 
for humanity as a whole, and German guilt could lead to 
an identity based on a common sense of humanity that 
transcended the forms of identity seen earlier in the century. 
Thus, the German nation would hardly be a nation at all, but 
rather a social group of people unified by shared liberal values 
and a public sphere where they could engage in politics. The 
factors once believed to help establish a nation—like common 
language, history, and ancestry—were thus nonfactors in 
Habermas’s view, at least in the post-war era. To him, the 
diminishing importance of traditional national identities 
would lend itself to European integration, for there would 
be a particular good common to different communities in 
the form of a shared legal system (Menent, 2018). 
Though Habermas’s later attempts to extend his theory to 
all of Europe and incorporate the possibility of a European 
identity has faced much more criticism among scholars, it 
continues to find support in the post-war era and has been 
adopted by a number of eager, idealistic European politicians 
committed to the idea of a regional community bound 
together by liberal democratic values.
To recapitulate, the 20th century has seen the emergence of 
theories of constitutional patriotism that reject conventional, 
traditional conceptions of national identity associated with 
the German Romantics and Nazi ethnonationalists. Instead, 
these modern theories of collective identities are grounded in 
either concrete ideas pertaining to the state or abstract ones 
pertaining to liberal democratic values. These theories gained 
traction in the late 20th century, and while many have since 
been disillusioned, they remain prominent as a consequence 
of recent German policy and the perceived potential in the 
EU’s ability to nurture a transcendent European identity. In 
2016, Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas even stated that 
“[Germany] has a murky past, but our parents’ generation 
has created a modern Germany: cosmopolitan and liberal 
domestically, good neighbors and peaceful partners abroad” 
(Brady, 2016). It is apparent that a civic postnational view 
remains influential, at least within the state. For these 
modern theories to be determinedly accurate, there must be 
evidence demonstrating that German guilt has maintained 
its resilience as a social phenomenon and cultural or ethnic 
differences are marginal factors that have little to no effect in 
interactions between individuals.
Although the idea that the end of history had been reached 
is not nearly as promising as it once had been, and political 
theorists like Habermas and government officials concede 
that there remain a number of challenges that regional 
institutions like the EU must face, they are firm in their 
belief that the advent of postnational societies or civic-based 
nations is imminent. Many western European countries have 
pursued a form of regionalism wherein national identities are 
superseded by a broader European identity, but no country 
has pursued this ideal with more fervor than Germany. From 
the outset, the new FRG under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
has adopted a foreign policy of Westbindung [binding of 
the West], sowing the seeds for a long-term project of 
incorporating the people into a greater European collective. 
Currently, many believe that this project has begun seeing 
success or at least managed to nurture a national identity 
predicated on civic elements. This is seen most clearly in a 
statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s longest-
serving foreign minister: “the more European our foreign 
policy is, the more national it is” (as cited in Kirchick, 2018). 
While I disagree with Genscher’s assessment, the arguments 
presented in its defense speak to the complexity of the 
questions being addressed.
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Questioning German Guilt
Modern theorists have pointed to German guilt as the cat-
alyst for a new constitutional patriotism that would replace 
the traditional form of nationalism. This position is reason-
able considering that Germany experienced a period of near-
ly complete suppression of nationalist sentiments by both 
the government and the general public in the years immedi-
ately following World War II (Berlin, 2003). The tragedies 
brought about by Hitler’s regime—a regime many supported 
or were sympathetic to—diminished all traces of national-
ism in German society (Breuilly, 1992). However, the initial 
absence of national sentiments may not preclude a later rise 
of nationalism and nationalistic behavior. If this is the case, 
does German guilt ensure that nationalism will permanently 
remain at the fringes of political life? 
Allen (2010) pointed to the failure of the “New Right” in 
procuring significant support among the general population 
as one indication of the German people’s shift away from 
an ethnocentric view of the Volk. While believing in overtly 
positive responses to these questions may have been reason-
able, Connor (1994) provides an argument that tempers the 
implications of Allen’s (2010) claim:
Germans [had] held their ethnonational proclivities 
in tight rein. But as memories recede, as the reali-
zation grows that Nazism and German nationalism 
are not inevitably synonymous, as pride of postwar 
material and cultural achievements takes on the hue 
of pride in German achievements, as older Germans 
come to believe that Germany’s period of atonement 
and parole has lasted long enough, and as a postwar 
generation that believes it cannot be held in any way 
culpable for the mistakes of its parents comes into 
power, German nationalism manifests commensu-
rate signs of recovery. (p. 181)
Because the initial disappearance of German nationalism was 
the product of German guilt, there is a finitude that char-
acterizes the suppression of nationalism. Specifically, the 
temporal aspect of this suppression, which has involved the 
voluntary participation of the people under the state, is such 
that time nullifies the effects of German guilt. Thus, when 
Alexander Gauland, then an AfD candidate for the Bund-
estag, stated that Germans “have the right to be proud of 
the achievements of the German soldiers in two world wars” 
and when AfD’s chief in Thuringia Björn Höcke declared the 
Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame” and 
called for a “180-degree turnaround” with regards to German 
guilt, the responses were not a unified outcry against such 
sentiments being clearly nationalistic, but a mixed batter of 
utter outrage, sympathy, and agreement (as cited in Dearden 
2017; as cited in Huggler, 2017). Höcke later clarified that 
the Holocaust “is part of our history. But it is only part of our 
history” and that “guilt consciousness alone cannot create a 
healthy identity, but only a broken one” (as cited in “Fury 
as AfD,” 2017). Yet even his clarification directs attention 
to the problem of German national identity as it relates to 
the feelings of guilt, and more importantly, it hints towards 
the temporal aspect of guilt. As time passes, events fade into 
the backdrop of history, and the tragedies once believed to 
be embedded within the German character become dulled 
within the memories of the German people. 
While the New Right may have 
been at the fringe earlier, it is 
presently a powerful force to be 
reckoned with.
Consequently, the state’s attempts at forcing public con-
scious reflection have been met with increasing confusion 
and resentment. A divide exists between the state’s per-
ception of how the German nation ought to be defined 
and the perception held by many of its people. Although 
Allen (2010) was correct in asserting that Germans have 
shifted away from a strictly ethnocentric understanding 
of the nation, his implicit conclusion that shared his-
tory plays no role does not account for the time factor, 
which cannot be ignored considering the emotive nature 
of guilt. The rapid rise in popularity of the AfD lends 
merit to this idea, for the relative weakness of right-wing 
parties in the early 21st century has, over the course of a 
decade, shifted into relative strength. The AfD is seen as 
an ever-increasing threat by the left-wing and moderate 
parties, especially after the 2017 federal election. While 
the New Right may have been at the fringe earlier, it is 
presently a powerful force to be reckoned with.
A Popular Nationalism
What are the reasons for the feelings of disenfranchisement 
and concern that led to the rise of popular nationalist parties 
like the AfD? To what extent do they speak to the nature of 
Germans’ view of the Volk? Some scholars point to economic 
factors, such as low income and unemployment, as being 
responsible for increases in nationalist sentiments (Hill, 
2017; Staudenmeier, 2017). Unfortunately, these factors do 
not adequately explain the increase in support for the AfD 
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and certainly not the revival of nationalism. To determine 
the underlying factors, it is necessary to analyze public 
opinion in a broader sense, and polling and survey data offer 
good windows of opportunity for determining the content of 
German collective identity. In analyzing this data, notions of 
a German nation predicated on civic values and institutions 
begin to fall apart, and the reality of an ethnocultural 
conception of the nation becomes more evident.
Surveying “Germanness”
Language and religion are typically seen as the cornerstones 
of German culture, although the arts occupy a clear place as 
well. It may be pointed out that Catholic-Protestant divisions 
contradict the notion that religious affiliation is a primary 
binding factor; however, this superficial divide is superseded 
by a general sense of shared faith in Christianity in the face 
of the perceived threat of Islam. One of the most significant 
concerns held by Germans is the “loss of culture, values, and 
the way of life we grew up with”: in 2017, 19% believed that 
it was the greatest threat to the future of their children, and 
95% of those who voted for the AfD believed that Germany 
would experience a real loss of culture (Center for Insights in 
Survey Research, 2017; “Umfragen zur AfD,” 2017). 
The issues that Germans value 
reveal how the AfD grew its 
voter base so rapidly in 
just four years.
This perceived danger can, to an extent, be seen as stemming 
from the influx of Muslim refugees since 2015. Notably, 16% 
of respondents in a Center for Insights in Survey Research 
(2017) poll saw the refugee crisis as the biggest problem facing 
Germany and 20% believed it was the biggest issue facing 
Europe as a whole. Another survey found that 71% of all 
respondents were in favor of limiting the number of refugees 
in the long run, and 79% felt more needed to be done to 
integrate refugees (“Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). 
It should be noted that 54% of respondents believed that 
the refugees were an enrichment for the country (“Umfragen 
zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Still, 57% of all survey 
respondents and 92% of Afd supporters were worried that 
the influence of Islam was too strong (“Umfragen zur AfD,” 
2017; “Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Perhaps 
due in part to this perception, 52% of Germans either 
entertained the idea or were in favor of a “dominant culture” 
(“Over 50% of Germans,” 2017). Given that a significant 
portion of those who voted for a left-wing or center party 
in the 2013 elections switched affiliations and voted for 
the AfD in 2017—of the nearly 6 million votes that the 
AfD received in 2017, over 1 million of those votes came 
from those who voted for the CDU in 2013—the issues 
that Germans value reveal how the AfD grew its voter base 
so rapidly in just four years (Burn-Murdoch et al., 2017). 
Considering that the AfD desires cultural preservation and 
calls for the government to actively protect German culture 
as the “predominant culture” in its “Manifesto for Germany,” 
it is reasonable to presume that those concerned with the loss 
of German culture may feel the pull-factor of the AfD and 
the push-factor of what they perceive as the negligence of 
the parties they voted for in earlier elections (Alternative für 
Deutschland, 2017; Center for Insights in Survey Research, 
2017; Holscher et al., 2017).
The array of survey data suggests that the sentiments and 
policy prescriptions typically attributed to the AfD and other 
far right-wing groups are much more prevalent than believed. 
Cultural artifacts remain vital components of German 
collective identity. Germany’s neo-nationalism, therefore, 
cannot be condemned out of hand as simply a radical 
ideology maintained by fringe movements. Rather, it must 
be recognized as a genuine reaction to a perceived sudden 
shift in the normative social dynamics that characterize 
German life. 
It is important to note that Germans seem not in favor 
of rejecting or deporting all incoming refugees, but of 
expediting the process of deporting asylum seekers who have 
already been rejected. Additionally, Germans are willing to 
accommodate refugees insofar as the refugees are willing to 
integrate into society. This willingness is marked by a general 
acceptance of institutional methods for integrating and 
potentially assimilating refugees among other immigrants. 
In a recent survey, 76% of Germans without a migrant 
background agreed that immigrants ought to “adapt their 
behavior to German culture,” and 83% with a migrant 
background responded the same way (Chase, 2016). Though 
the disparity is not too great, it suggests, as Federal Minister 
Peter Altmaier stated, that the desire to assimilate on the part 
of immigrants in a broad sense is “abundantly and distinctly 
present” (as cited in Chase, 2016). Even though this data 
demonstrably undermines the postnationalist vision, it also 
shows the cultural aspects that underlie “Germanness.”
Immigration
While the proposition that German neo-nationalism has as-
sumed the ethnocultural trappings of Herder and Fichte as 
it did in the late 18th and early 19th centuries can be argued 
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simply on grounds of general public opinion, it is in study-
ing the real dynamics between ethnic Germans and those 
with migrant backgrounds on a more intimate level that the 
nature of neo-nationalism in Germany becomes more appar-
ent. Both steady flows and sudden influxes of immigrants 
are nothing new to Germany. As Bade (1995) observed, 
“since the late nineteenth century, transatlantic emigration 
from Germany has decreased while continental labor immi-
gration has increased” (p. 515). More relevantly, Goodman 
(2007) asserts that “the postwar story of German economic 
and social change has been very much informed, possibly 
dominated, by de facto immigration” (p. 100). Indeed, the 
Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] of the 1950s led to la-
bor shortages that required the FRG to pursue policies that 
encouraged immigration of Turkish Gastarbeiter [guest work-
ers]. But there is a major difference between immigration into 
Germany in the late 19th century and in the postwar era: in 
the former period, the government reacted in a hostile man-
ner to the influx of early immigrants, especially in Prussia 
(Bade, 1995). It was during this time that Germany was led 
from ethnocultural to ethnonational conceptions of the na-
tion as the government of the late 19th century “bound civil 
rights to the principle of ethnic descent,” thereby reaffirming 
jus sanguinis [the principle of ethnic heritage] (Bade, 1995, 
p. 522). By extension, the emphasis on ethnic background in 
relation to questions of citizenship laid the groundwork for 
the ethnic nationalist fervor that took Germany by storm in 
the 1930s through the outspoken rhetoric of politicians like 
Heinrich von Treitschke and, of course, Hitler. 
In contrast, immigration in the postwar era was encouraged 
by the FRG, even after reunification in 1990. Yet, despite the 
state’s genuine and commendable attempts to bring about a 
new age of multiculturalism and define the German nation in 
terms of civic values and democratic institutions, the public 
has nonetheless been much more reserved. The case of the 
Turkish population provides a rich instance in this regard.
Integration
The FRG does not track race in its census. However, 
independent analyses have been conducted that involve a 
number of different variables, like intermarriage, naming 
habits, and name-based discrimination. The rate of ethnic 
intermarriage is a powerful indicator of a minority’s 
assimilation into their new society; it is certainly one of the 
most easily observable signs of assimilation as well (Gerhards 
& Hans, 2009). It reflects the amount of interaction between 
members of different ethnic groups and their willingness to 
accept and accommodate one another (Janßen & Schroedter, 
2007). According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 
the intermarriage rate among first-generation Turkish men 
in 2008 was 7.1% and 12.1% for second-generation Turkish 
men; first-generation Turkish women had an intermarriage 
rate of 2.6% (Nottmeyer, 2009). The MPI even asserted 
that the increase in intermarriage between first- and 
second-generation Turks in Germany indicated “the second 
generation’s greater commitment to and integration into 
German society” (Nottmeyer, 2009). Intermarriage rates 
between Turks and Germans have, in fact, risen since 2008. 
As of 2017, the rate among Turkish women was 14% while 
the rate among Turkish men was 19% (“Love in Germany,” 
2018). This increase in intermarriages suggests not only 
a willingness among the Turkish population in Germany 
to integrate, but that there are increasingly more ethnic 
Germans willing to accept and accommodate Turks into 
German society. This seems to vindicate, to a small degree, 
the cosmopolitan claim that Europeans are moving beyond 
traditional nationalisms. 
Some have wrongly used 
these findings to push an anti-
immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric. 
It must also be considered that the ethnic component of 
collective identity can potentially detract with regards to 
Turkish integration. A 2018 study by the Center for Turkish 
Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen found that 89% 
of Turks feel they belong either “strongly” or “very strongly” 
in Turkey, greater than the 81% that answered in the same 
manner regarding Germany (Sauer, 2018). This dual identity 
leads to Ross’s (2009) assertion that “the strong ethnic ties and 
identification with the homeland that characterize German-
Turks provide meaning and comfort in daily life, but appear 
to impede assimilation” (p. 710). Some have wrongly used 
these findings to push an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. Kern (2016), for example, emphasized that ethnic 
Turks are, on average, “economically and educationally less 
successful than other immigrant groups.” Taken alone, this 
statement appears to be simply factual. However, when 
grouped with survey data that highlight only the negative 
elements of the Turkish population in Germany, the result is 
a view slanted to enhance a preconceived political ideology, 
which neglects the real progress made by German Turks 
towards assimilating and integrating. Although it may appear 
ethnic Turks are “resisting” assimilation and less inclined 
to assimilate compared to other minorities, the Turkish 
population’s relative acculturation is roughly equal to other 
immigrant populations that originate from countries that are 
culturally closer (Gerhards & Hans, 2009). In simpler terms, 
as Pokorny (2017) noted,
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Hans (2010) shows that the majority of immigrants 
do in fact assimilate into German society. The first 
generation generally does not assimilate complete-
ly, but some members of the second generation be-
come totally assimilated. When it comes to the con-
sumption of high culture, Hans (2015) notes that 
third-generation immigrants are no different from 
young Germans. (p. 11)
Despite this reality, many Germans have tended to distinguish 
themselves from German-Turks, as evidenced by the famous 
departure of Mesut Özil from the German national football 
team; Özil was quoted as saying, “I am German when we win, 
but I am an immigrant when we lose” (as cited in “German 
Turks still rooted,” 2018). Inter-ethnocultural relations may 
have improved, but there is clearly much progress to be made.
Hyphenation
Although there are a number of modes by which to 
demonstrate ethnic socialization between ethnic Turks and 
Germans, ethnic acculturation is most simply demonstrated 
via naming habits. Gerhards and Hans (2009) found that 
while Turks were less likely to give their children German 
names, having close interethnic relationships of any kind 
with ethnic Germans greatly increased the likelihood that 
a Turk would opt for a German name for their child, and 
“a high share of Turks married to German partners adopt 
naming habits completely in line with ethnic Germans.” 
Moreover, given that names are associated with particular 
ethnic groups, this also reinforces the idea that there is in 
fact a strong ethnic component to collective identities and 
how they are developed.
The existence of name-based discrimination is a powerful 
indicator of the importance of ethnicity as it relates to identity. 
Names have long been an identifier of ethnic background. 
In Bosnia, for example, last names specifically were used to 
identify friend and foe as the new country collapsed into 
civil conflict in the early- to mid-90s (Nye & Welch, 2017). 
While name-based exclusionary behavior in Germany is not 
nearly as dramatic as in Bosnia, there is  strong evidence that 
ethnic discrimination against individuals with identifiably 
Turkish names still exists in German society, particularly 
in schools and the workplace. In schools, Bonefeld and 
Dickhäuser (2018) found that “when a student was assumed 
to have a migrant background [through names], the dictation 
was graded less favorably compared to a student without 
a migrant background, namely by 0.3 grade steps” (p. 7). 
Bonefeld and Dickhäuser (2018) noted that this disparity is 
more likely a result of a positive bias toward students without 
a migrant background than a negative bias towards students 
with a migrant background. This bias may play a role in 
students with migrant backgrounds attending lower-track 
schools compared to native ethnic Germans. 
The ethnic component of 
collective identities is still 
important in how people 
interact in German society. 
Ethnic discrimination also exists in the workplace. Kaas 
and Manger (2012) found that applications marked by an 
identifiably German name were 14% more likely to receive 
callbacks from larger firms and 24% more likely to receive a 
callback from smaller firms than similar applications marked 
by an identifiably Turkish name. Again, the name-based 
discrimination found in the study was less severe than in other 
countries, like Greece against Albanians, Sweden against 
Arabs, and the United States against African Americans. 
These disparities in how students and applicants are treated 
based on their names indicate that the ethnic component of 
collective identities is still important in how people interact 
in German society (Bonefield & Dickhäuser, 2018).
Conclusion
German neo-nationalism, which has revealed itself gradually 
since 2013, has taken on an ethnocultural form that reflects 
19th century theories on what constitutes a nation according 
to the German Romantics. This is the case despite the 
FRG’s attempts to develop a multicultural society in which 
German identity is grounded in democratic institutions. 
Many politicians, theorists, and laymen alike argue that 
ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are anachronistic 
in the contemporary era and only the radical segments of 
the German population retain such conceptions. By and 
large, however, Germans have exhibited great concern as to 
the preservation of cultural artifacts, like language, arts, and 
religion, which they perceive may be under threat, especially 
following the influx of Muslim refugees in recent years.
Ethnicity remains an important part of Germany’s social 
dynamics, and judgments about the character of an individual 
are still made on the basis of ethnic/migrant background, even 
though the practice is not as prevalent as in other countries. 
It can therefore be said that German collective identity is not 
as firmly grounded in a constitutional patriotism or a form 
of postnationalism as many would like to believe. Instead, 
German collective identity involves strong cultural and 
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